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ABsTRAcT
With the formation of the WTO/GaTT, a substantial reduction of 
tariff barriers (TBs) was achieved, but many countries then tried to 
use more non-tariff barriers (nTBs) to achieve new trade protection. 
To date, about two-thirds of the countries in the world are members of 
WTO. This study aims to find the determinants of NTBs and ascertain 
whether the accession as a member of WTO can actually reduce the 
use of nTBs. The results indicate that WTO membership, tariff and 
unemployment exert a strong influence on the incidence of NTBs, 
while the exchange rate, political institution and economic size are not 
significant factors. In addition, tariffs and NTBs are complementary. 
The finding also reveals that WTO member use NTBs to a lesser 
degree than do non-members of the WTO. hence, we can conclude 
that accession to membership in the WTO reduces the use of nTBs.
Key words: Economic size, exchange rate, non-tariff barriers, Political 
institution, Tariff, Trade protection, unemployment, WTO
INTRODucTION
The establishment of General agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GaTT) in 1947 and 
its successor the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 was to encourage free 
trade between member states by regulating and reducing tariff barriers, quantitative 
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restrictions and subsidies on traded goods and by providing a common mechanism 
for resolving trade disputes. The GaTT conducted eight rounds of multilateral 
negotiations between 1947 and 1993. up to the Kennedy round (1967), negotiators 
were essentially pre-occupied with the reduction of tariff barriers. starting in the 
mid-1960s, recurring negotiating rounds expanded the scope of the GaTT to 
cover nTBs, such as antidumping measures, quantitative restrictions and product 
standards. an agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) was negotiated in 
the Tokyo round (1979), followed by agreements on sanitary and phytosanitary 
(sPs) measures, intellectual property rights and measures affecting trade in services 
in the uruguay round (1993)1.
Crowley (2003) reported tariffs on manufactured products fell from a trade-
weighted average of roughly 35 percent before the creation of GaTT in 1947 to 
about 6.4 percent at the start of the uruguay round in 1986. despite this success, 
GaTT faced certain problems, including liberalization of trade in agricultural 
products, handling the issues of intellectual property, and dealing with the issue 
of anti-dumping. These problems brought about the formation of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) through the uruguay round that took place from 
september 1986 to January 1995. The new GaTT treaty provided for an entirely 
new and different dispute resolution mechanism to eliminate the gridlock of the 
old system. Furthermore, the uruguay round expanded GaTT’s authority to new 
areas—agreements regarding trade in textiles, agriculture, services, and intellectual 
property were major achievements. Finally, new sets of rules regarding administered 
protection came into effect with the creation of the WTO in 1995.
Before the implementation of the WTO system, different trading partners would 
charge different tariffs and impose different regulations. The same product from 
different countries would often substantially differ in its selling price. however, 
with implementation of the WTO system, a country would have to charge the same 
tariff rate to all its trading partners. according to the World Bank, after the formation 
of the WTO in 1995, world import value increased sharply from usd 6.3 trillion 
in 1995 to usd 12.9 trillion and usd 18.4 trillion in 2005 and 2010, respectively. 
however, while WTO succeeded in reducing and eliminating tariffs around 
the world, non-tariff barriers for examples technical barriers to trade (TBT) and 
sanitary and phytosanitary (sPs) measures became a major concern. World Trade 
Organization (2012), Bacchetta and Beverelli (2012), staiger (2012) and Evenett 
(2012) reported the use of nTBs had been on the rise. Evenett (2012) reported that 
in 2009, about 60 percent of protectionism was implemented by G20 governments 
1 refer to hoekman (2013) for more detail.
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and in 2012 that percentage has risen to 79 percent. From year to year, the developed 
countries designed new types of non-tariff barriers (nTBs). For example, technical 
barriers which stipulate mandatory technical regulations and voluntary standards 
that a producer or exporter needed to abide to for a product, such as its size, shape, 
design, labelling and packaging became common in the  European union. studies 
like haveman and shatz (2004), Iacovone (2005), and daly and Kuwahara (1999) 
point out that tariff barriers (TBs) have fallen dramatically in Europe; however, 
NTBs still remain significant. As pointed out by Ching, et al. (2004) and Chemingui 
and Dessus (2008), NTBs are still prominent in the Asia Pacific and the Middle 
East countries. similarly, Kapuya (2015), Gebrehiwet et al. (2007) and Otsuki et 
al. (2001) observed that the utilization of nTBs do affect african country exports. 
according to amani (2007), agricultural products mainly exported by developing 
countries are the worst affected with particular commodities facing restraints such 
as import and export bans, quota restrictions, variable sPs and TBT restrictions, 
licensing requirements and seasonal restrictions. General manufactured goods 
which mainly produced by developed countries face few restrictions and when 
they do exist they tend to be the need to meet national standards or rules of origin 
requirements. a report on nTBs by the united nations Conference on Trade and 
development (unCTad) in 2005 noted that many developing countries have failed 
to export their agricultural and manufactured products to developed countries due 
to their inability to satisfy stringent environmental and safety standards.
Evidence shows that the traditional forms of protectionism – tariff decreases, 
however the non-traditional forms of protection is on the rise. Why governments 
use nTBs? Theoretically, the rationale for protectionism should protect domestic 
employment, infant industries, sources of government revenue, industry 
diversification, elimination of  trade deficits, and protection from unsafe product. 
This focus is supported by the studies of Cheh (1976), Takacs (1981), Mansfield 
and Busch (1995), Goldberg and Maggi (1999), and Kono (2009) who found that 
the level of employment does affect the level of protectionism. In addition, studies 
like that of Mansfield and Busch (1995) demonstrate that NTBs are governed 
by economic size, domestic institutions, and the interaction between these two 
factors. saksena and anderson (2008) agree, saying that economic size and 
political institutions also matter with regard to nTBs. There are also arguments 
that countries used nTBs to replace tariffs that took effect after joining WTO. 
Before joining WTO, a country is free to use tariffs as a form of trade protection. 
Government can raise import tariffs and other forms of trade protection during the 
crisis era. after became a member of WTO, the country is abided to reduce tariffs, 
government no longer able to rasie tariffs to counter recession. Government may 
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under pressure to use nTBs to restrict imports to protect local business during 
periods of macroeconomic weakness2. Mansfield and Busch (1995) pointed out that 
the recent proliferation of nTBs has done much to offset the gains in liberalization 
made by GaTT and WTO. a fuller understanding therefore needed of the factors 
that account for variations in NTBs across states. Hence, this study aims to find 
the determinants of nTBs, and ascertain whether accession as a member of WTO 
affects the level of nTBs. 
This study is important since WTO members comprising about two-thirds of 
the countries in the world and covering approximately 97 percent of world trade3. 
as part of their liberalization agenda, WTO had been actively reduce tariffs and 
nTBs such as import quotas that restrict quantities selectively as well as established 
guidelines for TBT and sPs (WTO, 2012). since the present tariffs rate are relatively 
low and there is an up trend in the use of nTBs, it is important to examine how 
successful the WTO has been in reducing the nTBs among its members. To our 
knowledge, no study to date has studied this issue. Therefore, the dual objectives 
of this study are to find the determinants of NTBs and  ascertain whether accession 
as a member of WTO reduces the use of nTBs. 
A LITeRATuRe RevIeW ON The DeTeRMINANTs Of NON-
TARIff BARRIeRs (NTBs) 
Theoretical Review
Much research on the determinants of trade policy has been focused on the efficacy 
of societal and statist approaches. According to Mansfield and Busch (1995), societal 
theories typically attribute patterns of protection to variations in demands made 
by pressure groups, whereas statist theories emphasize the effects of the national 
interest and domestic institutions in determining the level of protection. societal 
explanations consider trade policy to be the product of competition among pressure 
groups and non-state actors that are affected by commerce. societal approaches 
attribute little importance to policymakers and political institutions for the purposes 
of explaining trade policy. as Ikenberry et al. (1988) point out, societal theories 
view the state as “essentially passive; it acts as a disinterested referee for competing 
groups, and supplies policies to satisfy the demands of the successful domestic 
2 Ohlin (1969) found that success with tariff reductions may generate pressures on governments to 
impose new forms of nTBs.
3 To date, the membership in WTO has grown to 161 countries (WTO, n.d.). The trade percentage is 
drawn from Crowley (2003).
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players”4. studies of societal approaches infer the demands for protection based 
on macroeconomic or sectoral fluctuations. 
societal approaches have been criticized for systematically underestimate 
the effects of two factors that regulate the provision of protection: state interests 
with respect to trade policy and domestic institutions. On the contrary, statist 
theories emphasize the effects of the national interest and domestic institutions 
in determining the level of protection. analyses that emphasize state interests 
generally focus on the roles of politicians and policymakers in the formation of trade 
policy, holding constant societal pressures (Ikenberry et al., 1988). Many statists 
conclude that the ability of policymakers to advance the national interest depends 
in large measure on the extent to which domestic political institutions render them 
susceptible to demands by pressure groups and other non-state actors. Thus, one 
hypothesize scholars normally tested is that institutional factors that foster the 
insulation and autonomy of public officials bolster the ability of states to pursue 
trade policy consistent with the national interest (Mansfield and Busch, 1995).
empirical Review
Many studies have examined the trend or pattern of nTBs faced by various countries 
or regions. however, only a few studies have researched the determinants of nTBs. 
ray (1981a, 1981b) developed and tested a simple model for the determination of 
tariff and nTBs to trade across different industries within the united states. nTBs 
are assumed to be functions of predetermined tariffs, current imports, specific 
industry characteristics, and current foreign non-tariff trade restrictions. Both papers 
found that non-tariff trade restrictions  supplemented tariff protection in the united 
states and both tariff and non-tariff trade restrictions are biased toward industries 
where the united states has an apparent comparative disadvantage in world trade. 
The studies also produced substantial evidence that tariff and non-tariff trade 
restrictions predominate in industries that have very different market characteristics.
Grossman and helpman (1994) derived a model that relates an industry’s 
protection to the state of its political organization, the ratio of domestic output 
in the industry to net trade, and the elasticity of import demand or export supply. 
Goldberg and Maggi (1999) further extended Grossman and helpman (1994) model 
by introducing employment conditions of that industry and its growth, concentration 
indices, and changes in import penetration ratio to the model. however, none of the 
alternative specifications was found to significantly improve the fit of the model. 
4 The quotation is drawn from pp.7-8 of Ikenberry et al. (1988). See also Frieden (1988) and Mansfield 
and Busch (1995).
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They found that the pattern of protectionism in the united states as of 1983 was 
broadly consistent with the predictions of the model. 
Takacs (1981) investigated how the level of economic activity and 
unemployment rate affects pressures for instilling protectionism in the united 
states. Employing the Ordinary Least square, she found that the level of economic 
activity and the unemployment rate offered correct signs for protectionism and 
were statistically significant. Salvatore (1987) extended Takacs’s (1981) model 
by introducing one more equation to relate import penetration to protectionism. 
By employing the two-stage least-squares method and data from 1948 to 1985, 
he found that the level of economic activity strongly influences the pressures for 
protectionism.
Knettera and Prusa (2003) examined the relationship between anti-dumping 
filings and the macroeconomic factors in Australia, Canada, European Union, 
and the united states during 1980–1998. They found that real appreciation of the 
domestic currency and a fall in domestic real GdP will increase the number of anti-
dumping filings. Oatley (2010) then investigated anti-dumping due to changes in 
the exchange rate. using data from six industrialized countries between 1979 and 
2004, he found that anti-dumping increases when the real exchange rate is strong 
and decreases when the real exchange rate is weak.  
Mansfield and Busch (1995) and Saksena and Anderson (2008) then combined 
political and macroeconomic factors to model the incidence of nTB. using a cross 
sectional analysis, Mansfield and Busch (1995) modelled the incidence of NTB by 
combining the societal and statist approaches. Their findings lent support to the 
societal argument that macroeconomic fluctuations contribute to the demand for 
protection. Consistent with the societal theories, high levels of unemployment and 
appreciated currencies strongly relate to a high incidence of nTBs. Those factors 
that are highlighted by statist approaches also strongly relate to cross-national 
patterns of nTBs. as statist analyses do indeed predict, economic size  strongly 
relates to the incidence of nTBs. Large states have a greater incentive to impose 
protection than do their smaller counterparts. 
Mansfield and Busch (1995) also discovered considerable evidence indicating 
that domestic institutions help shape differences in nTBs. In addition, they added 
interaction terms for these factors. Their results yield substantial evidence that 
tariffs and nTBs are substitutes. In other words, nTBs are used to protect industries 
that have lost tariff protection. according to these authors, large states that use 
proportional representation (Pr) and have a small number of (large) electoral 
districts have an institutional environment in which politicians are insulated from 
societal pressures. such states are characterized by high levels of nTBs. however, 
saksena and anderson (2008) presented a critical reevaluation of this argument 
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and hypothesized (in contrast to the work of Mansfield and Busch in 1995) that 
Pr-based systems are associated with lower rather than higher levels of nTBs. 
The key finding of Saksena and Anderson (2008) indicates the majoritarian 
democracy variable is positive and also statistically significant. This finding 
indicates that the more majoritarian the political institutions of a state are, the higher 
their level of nTBs. since the key elements of a majoritarian system all derive 
from an underlying single-member district/plurality electoral system, their result 
supports their primary hypothesis and cuts against the findings of Mansfield and 
Busch (1995). apparently, Pr-based systems are associated with lower, rather than 
higher levels of nTBs. saksena and anderson (2008) also found that the larger the 
economy of a state, the more dependent it will be on international trade, and thus 
the higher will be its level of nTBs. The unemployment and ideology variables 
had no statistical significance.
In examining trade protectionism, Calder (1988), Cowhey (1993) and Kono 
(2009) relate protectionism to electoral institutions. Kono (2009) applied the 
level of a particularism- based vote, ballot and pool. a high particularism level 
suggests a small constituency size. Kono found that the smaller the constituency 
size, the higher were the nTB’s because the smaller constituency size increases the 
number of pressure groups. Calder (1988) argues that Japan’s system of medium 
size electoral districts led to Japanese policymakers being less autonomous and 
less insulated from interest groups. hence, Japanese legislators tend to be highly 
sensitive to constituency pressure, especially from relatively well organized groups, 
such as those in agriculture and small business. Similar finding were presented by 
Cowhey (1993).
Observers have worried about the role of nTBs in trade as a substitute for or 
in addition to actual tariffs. Mansfield and Busch (1995) found empirical support 
that tariffs and nTBs are actually substitutes. In contrast, ray (1981a, 1981b) 
and ray and Marvel (1984) claim the relationship between tariffs and nTBs are 
supplementary. 
Table 1 summarizes the variables commonly used in the literature and the 
direction of their impact on nTBs. We see that, many factors have emerged as 
possible reasons for nTBs. a large number of empirical studies on this topic 
infer there are demands for protection based on macroeconomic fluctuations and 
institutional factors. among the macroeconomic variables emphasized by these 
studies are economic growth, unemployment and the real exchange rate. Institutional 
factors that foster both insulation and autonomy, such as relative economic size, 
trade dependency, and specific political institution, have been used by several 
researchers to relate these institutional or political factors to the incidence of 
nTBs. Furthermore, some economists also argue that pre-existing tariff levels may 
162
International Journal of Economics and Management
Ta
bl
e 
1 
se
le
ct
ed
 li
te
ra
tu
re
 re
vi
ew
 o
n 
th
e 
va
ria
bl
es
 u
se
d 
to
 e
xp
la
in
 n
TB
s
D
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e
N
T
B
N
T
B
N
T
B
N
T
B
N
T
B
A
D
A
D
Ta
ri
ff+
N
T
B
e
xp
la
na
to
ry
 v
ar
ia
bl
e
sa
ks
en
a 
&
 
A
nd
er
so
n 
(2
00
8)
M
an
sfi
el
d 
&
 
B
us
ch
  
(1
99
5)
R
ay
 &
 
M
ar
ve
l  
(1
98
4)
R
ay
  
(1
98
1a
)
R
ay
  
(1
98
1b
)
K
ne
tte
ra
 &
 
Pr
us
a 
 
(2
00
3)
O
at
le
y 
 
(2
01
0)
c
he
h 
 
(1
97
6)
M
ac
ro
ec
on
om
ic
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
+n
s
+
re
al
 e
ffe
ct
iv
e 
ex
ch
an
ge
 ra
te
+
+
+
G
ro
w
th
G
d
P 
gr
ow
th
+
-
w
or
ld
 G
d
P 
gr
ow
th
+
im
po
rt 
gr
ow
th
-n
s
-n
s
R
el
at
iv
e 
si
ze
G
d
P
+
G
d
P/
w
or
ld
 G
d
P
+
im
po
rt/
G
d
P
+
im
po
rt/
w
or
ld
 im
po
rt
+
Po
lit
ic
al
 in
st
itu
tio
n
m
aj
or
ita
ria
n 
de
m
oc
ra
cy
+
co
rp
or
at
is
m
+
le
af
 se
at
s 
+n
s
pa
rli
am
en
ta
ry
 c
on
st
itu
en
ci
es
+
pr
op
or
tio
na
l r
ep
re
se
nt
at
io
n
+
163
The determinants of non-Tariff Barriers: The role of WTO Membership
Tr
ad
e 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n
do
m
es
tic
 ta
rif
f
-
+/
-n
s
+
+
∆
 d
om
es
ti
c 
ta
ri
ff
 
+
Fo
re
ig
n 
n
TB
+/
-
In
du
st
ry
 s
pe
ci
fic
r
&
d
 in
te
ns
ity
+/
-
+
co
ns
um
er
 g
oo
ds
 ra
tio
+
ag
ric
ul
tu
re
 d
um
m
y
+/
-n
s
in
du
st
ry
 c
on
ce
nt
ra
tio
n
+n
s/
-
-
∆
 in
du
st
ry
 c
on
ce
nt
ra
ti
on
+n
s
pr
od
uc
t h
et
er
og
en
ei
ty
-
-
sk
ill
 in
te
ns
ity
-
-
ca
pi
ta
l i
nt
en
si
ty
+
+
la
bo
ur
 in
te
ns
ity
-
+n
s
un
sk
ill
 la
bo
ur
+n
s
sc
al
e 
ec
on
om
ie
s
-
N
ot
es
: N
T
B
, n
on
-t
ar
if
f 
ba
rr
ie
r;
 A
D
, A
nt
id
um
pi
ng
; G
D
P,
 g
ro
ss
 d
om
es
ti
c 
pr
od
uc
t;
 G
N
P,
 g
ro
ss
 n
at
io
na
l p
ro
du
ct
; ∆
, c
ha
ng
e;
 R
&
D
, r
es
ea
rc
h 
an
d 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t;
 
th
e 
+
 s
ig
n,
 a
 p
os
it
iv
e 
an
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 c
oe
ffi
ci
en
t;
 th
e 
- 
si
gn
, a
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
an
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 c
oe
ffi
ci
en
t;
 +
N
S
, a
 p
os
it
iv
e 
bu
t n
on
-s
ig
ni
fi
ca
nt
 c
oe
ffi
ci
en
t;
 -
N
S
, a
 
ne
ga
ti
ve
 b
ut
 n
on
-s
ig
ni
fi
ca
nt
 c
oe
ffi
ci
en
t.
Ta
bl
e 
1 
(C
on
t.)
164
International Journal of Economics and Management
influence both the strength of the societal demands for NTBs and the willingness 
of government to meet those demands. Market characteristics such as market 
concentration, labour or skill intensity often been included by those studied nTBs 
based on industry level.
despite the growing importance of nTBs, there is still limited understanding on 
the determinants of nTBs. This is mainly due to the complex nature of the measures 
and the difficulties of collecting and analyzing data. Analyses of the determinants 
of NTBs have been largely limited to the study of the influence of macroeconomic 
fluctuations on NTBs (for example Ray, 1981a, 1981b and Takacs, 1981), except for 
Mansfield and Busch (1995) and Saksena and Anderson (2008) who had considered 
both macroeconomic and political factors. Our study agreed with Mansfield and 
Busch (1995) and saksena and anderson (2008) that it is more fruitful to include 
both macroeconomic and political factors in the analysis. Our study is different 
from Mansfield and Busch (1995) and Saksena and Anderson (2008) in that our 
study also consider the role of WTO in explaining the variation in cross-national 
patterns of nTBs. To our best knowledge, scholars have conducted little cross-
national research on nTBs and virtually none with a focus on the role of WTO. 
MeThODOLOGy
Theoretical framework
Our basic approach is that nTBs to trade are the result of both economic and political 
factors. The best-known work on the subject is Mansfield and Busch (1995). Using 
a cross sectional analysis, Mansfield and Busch (1995) modelled the incidence of 
NTB by combining the societal and statist approaches. According to Mansfield 
and Busch (1995), nTBs is subjects to a country’s economic size, unemployment 
rate, real exchange rate, existing tariff rate, and domestic political institutions. 
Mansfield and Busch (1995) argue that relatively large economies are likely to 
impose nTBs with little fear of retaliation from smaller states, a strong currency 
and a higher unemployment rate will influence the government to impose NTBs 
to protect domestic product. In addition, Mansfield and Busch (1995) viewed that 
tariffs and nTBs are substitutes for each other because groups that are already well 
protected by tariffs may bring less pressure to bear for new nTBs and also face 
more government resistance to their demands than the less well protected groups. 
In addition, Mansfield and Busch (1995) argued that NTBs is positively related to 
domestic political institutions. 
165
The determinants of non-Tariff Barriers: The role of WTO Membership
Model Specification
This study modifies the basic model used by Mansfield and Busch (1995) by adding 
a WTO dummy variable to capture any difference in the behaviour of members 
versus non-members of the WTO with respect to the implementation of nTBs. The 
basic cross-sectional regression thus becomes the following:
nTBt+1 = C + sIZEt + unEMt + TarIFFt + POLITICt  
+ rEErt + WTOt + et
(1)
where nTB is non-tariff barriers; unEM is the unemployment rate; TarIFF is a 
weighted mean-applied tariff; POLITIC is number of parliamentary seats (proxy 
for political institutions); rEEr is the real effective exchange rate; sIZE is the 
economic size. Four proxies, namely, national GdP, ratio of national GdP to global 
GdP, ratio of national imports to total global imports and imports as a percentage 
of GdP are used to measure relative size. Thus, we estimate equation (1) using 
these four variables one at a time.  In addition, WTO is the dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 for non-WTO members and 0 otherwise and e is the error 
term. Following Mansfield and Busch (1995), the dependent variable, NTBt+1, 
was used to indicate nTB was implemented one year after a country experienced 
macroeconomic fluctuations at time t.
Dependent variable
Following Mansfield and Busch (1995), the dependent variable, NTBt+1, was 
used. This is because normally the implementation of nTBs was after a country 
experienced recession or macroeconomic fluctuations such as high level of 
unemployment and appreciation of currency. This study assumed nTBs will be 
implemented if a country experienced macroeconomic fluctuations in previous year. 
Independent variables
WTO membership
as discussed earlier, one of the objectives of this study is to ascertain whether 
accession to membership in the WTO reduces the use of nTBs. since the goal 
of the WTO is to promote fairer and freer trade, it is expected that the possibility 
of imposing nTBs is lower for members of the WTO compared to countries that 
are non-members of WTO. This study thus uses a dummy variable for WTO to 
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capture any difference in the behaviour of members compared to non-members 
with respect to the implementation of nTBs. This dummy variable will take the 
value of 1 for a non-member of WTO and 0 for a member of WTO. The dummy is 
expected to carry a positive sign because non-members of WTO are comparatively 
more likely to impose nTBs.
Unemployment rate
Theoretically, one of the reasons for protectionism is to protect domestic 
employment. Cheh (1976) found that government increases nTB to protect labor. 
Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Kono (2009) showed that the unemployment 
rate has a positive relationship to trade protection. a higher unemployment rate 
will force government to implement trade barriers. Therefore, it is expected that 
there exists a positive relationship between the unemployment rate and nTBs. a 
previous study by Mansfield and Busch (1995) showed that the unemployment rate 
is significant and has a positive relationship with NTBs. However, Saksena and 
Anderson (2008) showed that the unemployment rate is not significant in terms of 
explaining the variation in the use of nTBs. 
Relative Size
Studies like those by Mansfield and Busch (1995) and Saksena and Anderson (2008) 
have shown that nTBs are governed by economic size. Intuitively, relatively large 
economies are likely to possess greater market power. Large states can exercise their 
power through the use of TBs or nTBs with little fear of retaliation from smaller 
states. In contrast, smaller states depend more on the international economy and 
trade, and therefore, are less likely to employ nTBs. hence, it is expected that the 
relationship between economic size and NTBs is a positive one. Mansfield and 
Busch (1995) used the ratio of a country’s GdP to the world GdP as one of the 
indicators to determine the size of an economy, while saksena and anderson (2008) 
argued that the GdP of a country alone is also a good measure of its economic size. 
In addition, both studies also included imports ratio in their model. Because 
imports ratio further determines the dependence of an economy on international 
trade. as mentioned earlier, countries that are more dependent on international 
trade are less likely to employ nTBs than are those countries that are more self-
reliant. Hence, the coefficient for the import ratio is a negative one. Mansfield and 
Busch (1995) use the ratio of an individual country’s imports to world imports, 
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while saksena and anderson (2008) use the ratio of a country’s imports to its GdP. 
since economic size and imports ratio maybe highly correlated, we will follow 
the approach of Mansfield and Busch (1995) to use these variables separately5. To 
examine the sensitivity of the results to alternative indicator of relative size, this 
study repeats the same estimations by employing four common used relative size 
indicators one at a time. The relative size indicators are GdP, GdP/World GdP, 
Import/World Import and Import/GdP.
Tariffs
In addition, we examine the effects of pre-existing tariff levels on nTBs. There 
are two current views on the relationship between tariffs and nTBs. according 
to Mansfield and Busch (1995), pre-existing tariff levels may influence both the 
strength of the societal demand for nTBs and the willingness of a government to 
meet those demands. Groups that are already well protected by tariffs may bring 
less pressure to bear for new nTBs and also face more government resistance to 
their demands than the less well protected groups. This relationship suggests that 
tariffs and nTBs are substitutes for each other, which is consistent with the view 
that nTBs are often used to protect industries that have lost tariff protection in 
successive rounds of the GaTT. 
however, some economists argue that tariffs and nTBs are complementary. 
NTBs are often used to protect those industries that are also beneficiaries of high 
tariffs. For example, nTBs are used to counter new foreign challenges to important 
economic sectors that are already the beneficiaries of tariff protection. Similarly, 
ray and Marvel (1984) found that u.s. nTBs were concentrated in those industries 
least affected by the Kennedy round of GaTT. ray (1981a, 1981b) also found that 
nTBs have been used to supplement tariff protection in the united states. Therefore, 
the coefficient of a tariff can be either positive or negative. Positive means the tariff 
and nTBs are complementary, while negative means they substitute for each other.
Various tariff rates have been employed in previous studies. Mansfield and 
Busch (1995) used the average national post-Tokyo round offer rate for each 
national state; ray (1981a, 1981b) used simple average u.s. tariff; and ray and 
Marvel (1984) applied Post-Kennedy round u.s. nominal tariff. This study, 
however, uses the weighted mean applied tariff calculated by the World Bank based 
5 saksena and anderson (2008) used both the GdP of a country and imports as a percentage of GdP as 
the indicators to determine the size of an economy. While Mansfield and Busch (1995) used the ratio 
of a country’s GdP to the world GdP and ratio of national imports to total global imports alternately.
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on the unCTad database because this tariff is the average of effectively applied 
rates weighted by product import shares that correspond to each partner country6.
The Real Effective Exchange Rate 
Previous studies, including those of Knettera and Prusa (2003), Oatley (2010) 
and Mansfield and Busch (1995), show that the exchange rate can influence 
protectionism. an appreciated currency increases the price of domestically produced 
goods and thus threatens to undermine both the export and import-competing sectors 
of that economy. This phenomenon occurs because when currency is strong, then 
imported goods become cheaper. To protect a domestic product, the demand for 
protection will thus increase. In another words, a strong currency will influence 
the government to impose nTBs. This study uses the real Effective Exchange 
rate (rEEr) because it is a measure of the value of a currency against a weighted 
average of several foreign currencies and divided by a price deflator or index of 
costs. rEEr is more suitable than other exchange rate measures because it relates 
to major currencies and is adjusted for inflationary effect. Since the higher the index 
of rEEr, the stronger the currency will be, rEEr is expected to have a positive 
relationship to the incidence of nTBs. 
Political Institution
a political institution is one of the factors that determine the implementation of 
NTBs. Mansfield and Busch (1995) used proportional representation and size of 
constituency to explain the influence of political factor on NTBs. They hypothesized 
that proportional representation and the number of parliamentary constituencies is 
positively related to the level of nTBs. In contrast, saksena and anderson (2008) 
used left seats and majoritarian to represent political influence. They assumed that 
left-wing parties have a major concern about the labor demand for protection, while 
right-wing parties are committed to capitalism and a free market. In addition, the 
more majoritarian the political institutions of a country, the higher the level of 
nTBs will be.
6 Data are classified using the Harmonized System of trade at the six- or eight-digit level. Tariff line 
data were matched to Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) Revision 3 codes to define 
commodity groups and import weights. To the extent possible, specific rates have been converted to their 
ad valorem equivalent rates and have been included in the calculation of weighted mean tariffs. Import 
weights were calculated using the united nations statistics division’s Commodity Trade (Comtrade) 
database. Effectively applied tariff rates at the six- and eight-digit product level were averaged for 
products in each commodity group (World Bank, n.d.).
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due to data limitations, we do not measure the size of the constituency in 
each district. Instead we use the number of parliamentary seats in a country to 
gauge the effect of political influence. We hypothesize that the larger the number 
of parliamentary seats in a country, the greater will be insulation and autonomy 
because individuals or small groups of politicians find it harder to gain the enough 
power to design trade policies that precisely reflect their economic preferences. 
hence, it is expected that the number of parliamentary seats and nTBs have an 
inverse relationship. 
Method
This study aims to find the factors that explain the cross-national patterns of NTBs. 
using the Ordinary Least square (OLs), Equation (1) will be regressed to estimate 
the parameters. OLS is a method to find the best regression line that minimizes 
the sum of the square residuals. according to halcoussis (2005), OLs is the best 
procedure to estimate the linear regression model. Mansfield and Busch (1995) 
stated that OLS estimations may suffer heteroskedasticity and therefore inefficient. 
In order to get the Best Linear unbiased Estimator (BLuE), various diagnostic 
tests will be used to test the robustness of the model. The diagnostic tests include 
the Jarque-Bera statistic tests for normality; Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier 
tests for serial correlation; White Test tests for heteroskedasticity in the error terms 
and Ramsey RESET tests for the misspecification of omitted variables, incorrect 
functional forms and correlation between the independent variables and the error 
terms. 
Data
data were obtained from a variety of sources. data for non-tariff barriers (nTBs) 
were obtained from World Bank based on unCTad database. nTB was based on 
the core nTB, including quantity and price restrictions. Trade coverage ratio was 
provided by unCTad as the best estimate of nTB and the views of many experts. 
The nTB data was compiled for 30 countries: algeria, argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Brunei, Chile, China, Colombia, Cote d’ Ivory, Ecuador, Egypt, Japan, Jordan, Lao 
Pdr, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, nicaragua, nigeria, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, 
senegal, singapore, sudan, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, uruguay, and Venezuela7. 
Information on WTO membership accession was extracted from the WTO website. 
data for GdP, world GdP, imports (IM), world imports, real Effective Exchange 
7 These are the countries that data of nTBs are available.
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rate (rEEr), unemployment rates (unEM), and tariffs were obtained from the 
World Bank; data for parliamentary seats were found on the united nations’ website. 
all explanatory variable data were for year 2000 and nTB data was for year 20018. 
ResuLTs AND DIscussION
Table 2 presents the results from OLs regression. Four relative size variables are 
employed in the estimations. Overall, the estimated coefficients are quite consistent 
across four models. The coefficients for tariff and WTO are both statistically 
significant and carried the expected sign in Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3. 
Unemployment rate are statistically significant in all four models, however, it carried 
the wrong sign. This finding suggests that tariffs, unemployment and membership 
in WTO are important determinants of nTBs.
The innovation in this study is the addition of a dummy variable for WTO 
to capture whether there is any difference in the behaviour of WTO members or 
non-members with respect to the implementation of nTBs. The dummy variable 
took the value of 1 for non-member status and 0 otherwise. The WTO is expected 
to be positive because the possibility to impose nTBs is higher for a country that is 
non-member of the WTO. The result in Table 2 shows that this dummy variable is 
statistically significant and carries the expected positive sign. Hence, non-members 
of the WTO are most likely to impose nTBs than are members of the WTO.
According to Mansfield and Busch (1995), the coefficient of tariff can be either 
positive or negative. Positive means that the tariff and nTBs are complementary, 
while a negative coefficient means they can substitute for one another. Table 2 
indicates that the coefficient of tariff is positive and statistically significant at 10 
percent. The result indicates that a 1 percent increase in tariff is complemented 
by roughly a 1 percent increase in nTBs. This result is supported by ray (1981a, 
1981b), but is contrary to Mansfield and Busch (1995) who found that tariff is a 
substitute for nTBs.
Based on the theory, unemployment rate (unEM) has a positive relationship 
with NTBs. Mansfield and Busch (1995) found that unemployment rate has a 
significant positive relationship with NTBt+1 which showed that when a country 
suffered from increased in unemployment, government will respond by increases 
nTB next year. saksena and anderson (2008) found unemployment rate has a 
positive relationship with NTBs, but not a significant one. However, our result 
8 nTB data were extracted from “Frequency coverage ratio of nTBs by country”. year 2001 were 
chosen based on the availability of nTB data. year of data available for nTB is different for different 
country, ranging from 1993 to 2001. year 2001 were chosen because this is the year that had most data 
that is 30 countries.
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indicates that the unemployment rate is negative which is contradicts to the theory. 
It suggests that decline in previous year unemployment rate led to the rise of nTB 
in current year. The negative relationship obtained between unemployment rate and 
nTBs may due to only one year lag (t+1) was used in this study. It is normal for the 
government to take more than a year to respond to the increase in unemployment. 
Government will impose nTBs only if the unemployment problem is persistent. 
Table 2 shows that the positive coefficient of real effective exchange rate 
(REER) is in accordance with the theory, but not statistically significant. Similarly, 
political institution variable (POLITIC) carried the expected sign, but the sign was 
not statistically significant. As shown in Table 2, none of the relative size variable 
is statistically significant. Hence, there is no evidence that economic size directly 
relates to the incidence of nTBs.
Table 2 OLs regression results
variables expected  sign
Coefficient
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
C -2.20 -2.20 -6.70 6.41
TarIFF +/- 1.08 c 1.08 c 1.17 c 0.73
rEEr + 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.28
unEM + -0.51 c -0.51 c -0.48 c -0.57 b
POLITIC - -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
WTO + 15.13 c 15.13 c 15.01 c 13.04
Relative size:
GdP + 160.30
GdP/world GdP + 4.96
IM/world IM - 386.22
IM/GdP - -0.15
Diagnostic Tests:
JB 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.79
LM 0.95 0.95 0.74 0.79
White 1.22 1.22 1.29 1.31
rEsET 0.09 0.09 0.84 0.95
Notes: JB is Jarque-Bera statistics for normality with the null hypothesis of residuals are normally 
distributed. LM is the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier test for serial correlation, White is White’s 
test for general heteroskedasticity and RESET is Ramsey RESET test for functional misspecification. 
The F-statistics reported for LM, White and rEsET are under the relevant null hypothesis that absence 
of serial correlation, heteroskedasticity and functional misspecification. a, b and c denotes significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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In addition, this study completed a series of diagnostic tests. JB is Jarque-Bera 
statistics for normality with the null hypothesis of residuals normally distributed. 
LM is the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier test for serial correlation, White is 
White’s test for general heteroskedasticity, and rEsET is ramsey’s rEsET test for 
functional misspecification. The F-statistics reported for LM, White, and RESET 
fall under the relevant null hypothesis, namely, the absence of serial correlation, 
heteroskedasticity, and functional misspecification. The results in Table 2 show 
that all the JB and F-statistics failed to reject the null hypotheses, and hence, we 
can conclude that the residuals were normally distributed and there was no serial 
correlation, heteroskedasticity, and incorrect functional form. Overall, the estimated 
models reported in Table 2 are well specified.
cONcLusION AND RecOMMeNDATIONs
This study sought to find the determinants of NTBs and ascertain whether accession 
to membership in the WTO reduces the use of nTBs. Our result indicates that WTO 
membership, tariff, and unemployment rate are the main determinants of nTBs. This 
finding suggests that non-WTO members used NTBs to a greater degree compared 
to members of the WTO and suggests that the WTO successfully influenced its 
members to implement fairer and freer trade. Indeed the uruguay round took seven 
and half years to discuss, making the trading system freer and less discriminatory. 
Furthermore these results show that tariffs and nTBs are complementary, possibly 
due to the WTO agreement not to set the same percentage of tariff elimination for 
all countries. For example, developed countries have committed to bind their tariff 
rates on 99 percent of their product lines, whereas only 73 percent of the developing 
countries’ product lines are bound9. The WTO also allows flexibility in the use of 
trade measures to protect infant industries. The least developed countries can charge 
import tariffs to protect their new industries on their early stages of development and 
thus not yet capable of competing against established industries. This situation can 
contribute to the result herein that shows that nTBs and tariff are complementary.
This study obtained an unexpected negative relationship between unemployment 
rate and nTBs, which may be due to only one-year lag used in this study. Future 
research should consider including higher lags, as a government may take more than 
one year to respond to any increase in unemployment. Future research should also 
divide the sample into developed and less developed countries. normally, developed 
9 Bound tariff rates are the most-favored-nation tariff rates resulting from negotiations under the General 
agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GaTT). These maximum rates are committed in the WTO and are 
difficult to raise.
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countries do not use nTBs as often as developing countries do. however, there is 
up trend in the use of nTBs among developed countries. as highlighted by others 
researchers, the availability of NTBs data is a problem because the classification of 
NTBs differs based on the country. A concrete definition, categories of NTBs, and 
methods of calculation, need to be standardized to help future researchers obtain 
the exact number of nTBs.
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